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ABSTRACT 
Cereal price variability in Ethiopia has worsened in recent years, and some of the earlier liberalizations 
are being reversed due to the unacceptable economic and political costs of increased price variability. The 
challenge now is to achieve price stability in a cost-effective way. This paper examines intercommodity 
price relationships to assess the relative importance of each of the three major cereals in generating price 
volatility. Based on the estimates from a dynamic econometric model, the paper concludes that maize is 
the most significant in exacerbating price variability with respect to the persistence of shocks to itself and 
the two other cereals. This implies that focusing on maize, instead of wheat, will not only help better 
stabilize prices but also reduce costs of stabilization. The results are also discussed in the context of 
ongoing policy discussions.  
Keywords:  Ethiopia, food price stabilization, common trend, cointegration 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The staple food basket of households in developing countries typically consists of more than one 
substitutable cereal. Substitutability essentially implies that the prices of the cereals have a long-run 
relationship and shocks to one of the markets will get transmitted to the rest, across space and time, if 
markets are integrated. However, not all cereals entail the same degree of risk exposure, nor are they 
equally liked by the consumers in a given country. For instance, production of modern-variety cereals is 
riskier than that of traditional varieties; and one of the cereals in a household’s food basket can often be 
preferred to the others. In such conditions, the persistence of a shock would be different for different 
commodities, with clear implications for technology adoptions, crop portfolio choices, and eventually 
supply responses.
1  
From a policy standpoint, an understanding of inter-commodity price relationships and shock 
transmissions becomes particularly important for developing countries, where cereals account for a large 
share of agricultural value-added, prices are volatile, social safety net programs are large,
2 and modern 
and traditional technologies coexist. In such economies, farmers will have to be self-sufficient in basic 
staples to protect themselves against price risks (de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet 1991), are not likely 
to diversify toward cash crops if cereal prices are volatile (Fafchamps 1992), and will make less risky 
crop choices (Dercon 1996; Murdoch 1995). These results hold in the presence of market failures (such as 
inadequate infrastructure, incomplete credit and insurance markets, and information asymmetry), a fact 
that formed the basis for public interventions in the cereal markets (Timmer 1989).  
While parastatals or marketing board-centric policies of cereal price stabilization proved 
expensive and led to rent seeking and inequitable distribution of benefits (Bates 1981; Newbery and 
Stiglitz 1981; Sahn, Dorosh, and Younger 1997), market liberalization has not proved to be fully effective 
either, implying that the fundamental rationales for cereal price stabilization remain valid in many 
countries. In fact, contrary to common expectation, there is now a growing perception that reforms have 
led to increased food price volatility and that risk is a major factor constraining deeper reforms, leading to 
reversals of the reform processes in a number of countries (World Bank 2005). While few dispute the 
importance of developing better-functioning markets as the long-term solution, there is a need for short-
term intervention to address price instability—particularly if complete liberalization exposes countries to 
levels of volatility that are unacceptable in terms of economic, human, and political costs.  
Thus, managing cereal price instability continues to receive policy attention in many developing 
countries. Ethiopia is such a country, where all cereals are non tradable, price volatility is high, and both 
food aid and food-based intervention programs are large. Monthly cereal price variability in the country is 
not only among the highest in the world but has even worsened since 2000 (Gabre-Madhin and Mezgebou 
2006). Both import and local procurement of food aid in the country are substantial, and their effects on 
cereal markets are hotly debated.
3 From 1993 to 2004, food aid imports and domestic procurement 
averaged about 700,000 tons and 83,000 tons, respectively. Finally, the country launched one of the 
largest social safety net programs in Africa in 2005, called the Productive Safety Net Programs (PSNP), 
which combines food aid with cash transfers to the beneficiaries. In 2006/07, the program disbursed 1.3 
billion ETB (Ethiopian birr) in cash, equivalent to about US$150 million, and distributed 326,000 tons of 
cereals.  
Using monthly price data for three major cereals in Ethiopia (teff, maize, and wheat),
4 this paper 
conducts a set of analyses to better understand the intercommodity price relationships and shock 
                                                       
1 The literature on risks and crop choices is large; see Dercon (1996) for a review.    
2 Note that success of the cash-based social safety net programs, which are being increasingly recommended, also critically 
depends on cereal price stability. As Rashid and Lemma (2010) illustrates, the value of cash transfers declined drastically at the 
time of food price hike and hence all Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) beneficiaries preferred food over cash. 
3 There are many studies, with mixed conclusions, on the effects of food aid in Ethiopia, some of which are discussed in a 
later section. For details, see Gilligan and Hoddinott 2006; World Bank 2006; Abdulai, Barrett, and Hoddinott 2005; Yamano, 
Christiansen, and Alderman 2005; and Jayne et al. 2002. 
4 These three cereals account for more than 67 percent of cereal production in the country.   
2 
transmissions. The analysis builds on the idea proposed by Alderman (1993), who examined 
intercommodity price transmittal across two commodities in two separate market locations in Ghana. We 
adopt the methodologies proposed by Gonzalo and Granger (1995) to analyze the long-run price 
relationships among the commodities and by Pesaran and Shin (1998) to examine the significance and 
persistence of shocks to a given commodity on the dynamics of both itself and other commodities. The 
implementation of the methods involves estimating common long-run memories for each cereal across 
market locations, examining cointegration among the common long-run memories, and finally conducting 
impulse response analyses to study shock transmission.  
An essential first step in implementing these methods is an analysis of market integration, which 
is a precondition for the transmission of price signals and shocks among commodities and over time. A 
substantial body of literature exists on methods of analyzing market integration, with more recent 
applications relying on variants of parity bound models (PBMs) and multivariate cointegration. However, 
neither method is free from criticisms. For instance, PBMs are criticized as being bivariate analyses of 
variables that emerge from a multivariate context (Gonzalez-Rivera and Helfand 2001; Fackler 2004), 
their results as being sensitive to underlying distributional assumptions (Fackler 1996; Barrett and Li 
2002), and their methods as assuming shocks to be serially independent and hence failing to explain 
dynamic adjustments (Fackler 2004). On the other hand, the cointegration methods are criticized as being 
neither necessary nor sufficient for spatial market efficiency (McNew and Fackler 1997; Fackler and 
Goodwin 2001) and as being unable to explicitly account for transfer costs (Barrett 1996; Barrett and Li 
2002).
5  
For analyzing the issues that this paper attempts to address, the multivariate cointegration method 
has some distinct advantages. In particular, the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) method allows  
1.  analyzing price relationships among multiple commodities across multiple spatial locations;  
2.  testing for the significances of commodities in terms of their importance in driving long-run 
variability, and  
3.  system reduction that enables modeling a larger number of variables without running into 
degrees-of-freedom problems.  
The generalized impulse response of Pesaran and Shin (1998), on the other hand, is invariant to ordering 
and therefore has distinct advantages in innovation accounting and in being conclusive about the 
persistence of shocks.  
   
                                                       
5 To some extent the transfer costs problem can be addressed through threshold autoregression methods (Goodwin and 
Piggott 2001; Goodwin and Harper 2000).  
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2.  METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
Characterization of Integrated Markets 
Consider a market of a homogeneous commodity that is traded in n  spatially separated locations with a 
corresponding price vector of  } .... ,......... , { 2 1 nt t t P P P . If trade exists among all locations, then these 
locations are said to be integrated if
6  
1.  } .... ,......... , { 2 1 nt t t P P P can be decomposed as   where  t t P f ⊥ =α  is 
the common long-run memory representing the integrating vector and  it P ~
 is the transitory 
component for each location; 
2.  for all i ,  0 ≠ i a ; and  
3.  s Pi'  are cointegrated with exactly  1 − n  cointegrating vectors.  
Conditions 1and 2 are standard, but 3 is a stricter condition, which ensures that there is one and 
only one common long-run memory (common stochastic trend) in a set of nonstationary price variables.
7 
The underlying idea of this characterization, particularly of imposing condition 3, is that if there were 
more than one common trend, it would be difficult to identify how long-run movements of prices are 
generated. As Gonzalez-Rivera and Helfand (2001) point out, if there were two common trends, some 
prices could be generated by the first trend, some by the second trend, and some by a combination of the 
two. In such a situation, market locations cannot be considered integrated.  
Estimating  t f  and Generalized Impulse Response  
Given the characterization of market integration, both the estimation of  t f (Gonzalo and Granger 1995) 
and the generalized impulse response (Pesaran and Shin 1998) can be carried out within Johansen’s 
(1988) and Johansen and Juselius’s (1990) multivariate cointegration framework. Formally, let 
} .... ,......... , { 2 1 nt t t t P P P P =  be an  1 × n  non-stationary vector of prices, where  it P is the log price of a 
homogeneous commodity at time t in market location i . The price relationship across locations can be 
represented as an unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR) with k lags of Pt, as follows:  
  t t k t k t t D P A P A P ε µ + Φ + + + + = − − ... 1 1
 
(1) 
where  t P  is  ( ) 1 × n  and each of the i A is an ( ) n n× matrix of parameters,  t D  is a vector of deterministic 
variables, and  t ε  is a vector of identically and independently distributed residuals. According to 
Granger’s representation theorem, the vector  t P  has a vector autoregressive error correction 
representation,  
  ) , , 1 (
1
1
1 T t t P P P t
k
i
i t i t t ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = + + + ∆ Γ + Π = ∆ ∑
−
=
− − ε δ µ
 
(2) 
                                                       
6 This is the same characterization used by Gonzalez-Rivera and Helfand (2001) and Rashid (2004). 
7 This follows from the fact that there is a complete duality between vector autoregression (VAR) representation, used in 
analyzing cointegrating relations, and vector moving average (VMA) representation, which analyzes the structure of common 
trends (Johansen 1991; Juselius 1994).   
, ...... 1 , ~ n i P f a P it t i it = + = 
4 
where  n I k
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and µ  and δ  are a vector of a constant and a trend coefficient respectively. 
The hypothesis of cointegration in the error correction model depends on the properties of the 
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For this process, Pt is stationary if all roots of A have modulus greater than one, but Pt is I(1) if A 
has unit roots. If  1 = z  is a root, Π has a reduced rank of  n r   and the hypothesis of cointegration is 
formulated as  β α ′ = Π Η : ) (r , where α  and β  are  r n×  matrices of full column rank and r is the 
rank of Π that determines how many linear combinations of  t P  are stationary. Given the characterization 
of integrated markets, searching for market locations that share a common trend is equivalent to testing 
for  1 − = n r .  
The long-run memory  ) ( t t P f ⊥ =α and the generalized impulse response functions can be 
estimated by a vector moving average (VMA) model. There is a complete duality between VAR, used to 
analyze cointegrating relationships, and VMA, used to analyze the common long-run memory structure. If 
the root of equation (3) is equal to one or has moduli  1 ≤ , and if  ⊥ ⊥Γ ′ β α  has a full rank of  r n − , the VMA 
representation of equation (1) can be written as 
  ( ) ( )( ) ,
1 A D L C D C X t t
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The common long-run memory ( t t P f ⊥ =α ) is derived from equation (4); Pesaran and Shin 
(1998) show that the generalized impulse response function can be derived as  
  ∑ ′ =
−      j n jj
g





where  jj σ  is the  th JJ  element of the residual variance–covariance matrix Σ of the vector  t Z ,  t e  is an  1 × m  
vector with unity at the  th J  row and zeros elsewhere, and  n is the number of periods ahead.  
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3.  NOTES ON DATA 
The data for this analysis were provided by the Ethiopian Grain Trading Enterprise (EGTE), the country’s 
grain marketing parastatal, which has been collecting monthly price data for selected grains since the 
1980s. The agency collects data from 24 market locations, but time series are incomplete with a very 
large number of missing values. For example, in Bahirdhar, one of the important market centers, there are 
a total of 63 missing values, with about 36 consecutive missing values starting from 2004. Reasonably 
complete series are available for six market locations—Addis Ababa (AA) and Nazareth (NZ) in the 
center, Mekelle (MK) in the north, Dire Dawa (DD) in the east, Jimma (JM) in the southwest, and 
Shashameni (SM) in the central south—from January 1996 to December 2007. A few remaining missing 
values in this data set were interpolated.  
Although a larger number of market locations would have added value to the analysis, the 
sampled locations provide a good representation of the key production and populated regions of Ethiopia. 
Only two regions in the country, Amhara and Oromya, account for 87 percent of Teff and wheat 
production and about 82 percent of maize production of the country. Except for wheat, for which annual 
imports (mainly food aid) averaged 31 percent of productions, international trade of cereals has been 
practically zero since early 2000s (Rashid, 2010). Addis Ababa connects both of these production regions, 
with Dire Dawa in the east and Mekelle in the north being the other two main consumption regions. 
Nazreth and Shashemene serve as two main surplus areas market locations. 
A standard first step in cointegration analysis is conducting tests to check if the variables are non-
stationary. Given our characterization of market integration, these tests are particularly important, since 
there is a one-to-one relationship between the number of stationary variables and the number of 
cointegrating relationships (Hansen and Juselius 1995). More specifically, if x numbers of stationary 
variables are included, the number of cointegrating vectors will also increase byx. This means, given our 
definition of market integration (finding exactly n - 1 cointegrating vectors), inclusion of stationary 
variables can potentially change the conclusions. We have applied the augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
(ADF) and a test from Kwiatkowski and others (1992) to examine the stationarity of the individual series. 
Both tests suggest that all series are I(1). For the sake of brevity, the results of these tests are not included, 
but they are available from the author upon request.  
6 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
General Note on Estimation 
A key element of implementing the methodology is the determination of cointegration rank (that is, the 
rank of Π), which critically depends on appropriate lag length and deterministic components (constant, 
time trend, and so onF) in the cointegration space (Johansen 1992; Johansen and Juselius 1992). 
Information criterion and lag reduction tests
8 are performed to determine the lag length, and the 
appropriate deterministic components are decided based on a Pantula method, as proposed by Johansen 
(1992). Three alternative models are considered to implement the Pantula method: (1) restricting all 
deterministic components to a constant, (2) allowing a constant and a deterministic trend in levels, and (3) 
allowing a constant in the cointegrating relation, a trend in level, and a trend in cointegrating relations.
9  
The extent of market integration is examined as follows. For each of the three cereals, analysis 
begins with three major locations, Addis Ababa, Nazareth, and Jimma. If cointegration rank is found to be 
n - 1 with appropriate lag and other diagnostics, another location is added and the procedure is repeated. 
This is done until each minor location, in turn, has been added to the three major locations.
10 Once the 
extent of integration is determined, the common long-run memories are estimated using a VMA model. 
For any given cereal, the coefficients of the long-run memories provide some indications of the 
importance of market locations in the long run. However, they do not explain how shocks to one of the 
cereals get transmitted to the rest. Following Gonzalo and Granger (1995), this is done by examining the 
relationships among the common long-run memories of the three cereals, which are I(1) variables by 
definition.  
The Extent of Integration 
The results of the sequential procedure of determining n - 1 cointegrating vectors are presented in Table 
4.1. The first column shows the sequence in which market locations are analyzed for the three 
commodities. We began with three main locations (AA, NZ, and JM), which the tests suggest share a 
common long-run memory. For each addition of market location, the null hypothesis of Ho: 1 − = n r  is 
tested against the alternative, H1:  2 − = n r , with Johansen’s  Trace λ  tests. As an illustration, consider the 
results for wheat.  For the three main market locations,  2 − = n r  is clearly rejected at the five percent 
level of significance.
11 The same conclusion holds when SM is included. However, when DD or MK is 
added, the hypothesis Ho: 1 − = n r  is rejected in favor of the alternative, H1: 2 − = n r , implying that 
these market locations share different common long-run memories. The test results are similar for the 
other two cereals. Thus, we conclude that only the market locations in the center (AA and NZ), southwest 
(JM), and south central (SM) areas are integrated, and the rest (in the north and east) are not. 
                                                       







  for  max , 2 k j   = and 
1 1 , j- ,    i   = , respectively. It is an LR test that follows  2 χ distribution with 
2 ) ( n i  j− degrees of freedom. 
9 The ordering of the models is done from most to least restrictive. Johansen (1992) discuss the rationales for using this 
ordering and for selecting the model using the Pantula method.    
10 The diagnostics included tests for normality, autocorrelations, and autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH).  
11 Although not reported, the roots of the companion matrix were calculated to double-check accuracy of rank 
determination. For the sake of brevity, these results are not reported, but they are available from the author upon request.   
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Table 4.1—Cointegration rank tests for maize, wheat, and teff prices in various markets locations 
1 : 1 : 0 − < − = n r H against n r H a   
Commodity / market 
locations  ( ) r Π  
Trace test  Critical values 
Trace (90)  Trace (95) 
Tests for maize  
 
Addis + Nazareth + Jimma 
+ Shashemene 
0  76.99  59.14  62.99 
1  40.26  39.06  42.44 
2  14.62  22.76  25.32 
3  2.89  10.49  12.25 
Addis + Nazareth + 
Jimma + Shashemene + 
Dire Dawa 
0  107.35  83.2  87.31 
1  65.63  59.14  62.99 
2  38.26  39.06  42.44 
3  15.32  22.76  25.32 
4  5.48  10.49  12.25 
Addis + Nazareth + 
Jimma + Shashemene + 
Mekelle 
0  129.32  83.2  87.31 
1  67.97  59.14  62.99 
2  42.13  39.06  42.44 
3  16.8  22.76  25.32 
4  2.67  10.49  12.25 
Tests for wheat  
 
Addis + Nazareth + 
Jimma + Shashamene 
0  84.08  59.14  62.99 
1  55  39.06  42.44 
2  27.45  22.76  25.32 
3  4.53  10.49  12.25 
Addis + Nazareth + 
Jimma + Shashemene + 
Dire Dawa 
0  105.66  83.2  87.31 
1  71.05  59.14  62.99 
2  42.55  39.06  42.44 
3  19.3  22.76  25.32 
4  5.72  10.49  12.25 
Addis + Nazareth + 
Jimma + Shashemene + 
Mekelle 
0  101.45  83.2  87.31 
1  68.89  59.14  62.99 
2  39.21  39.06  42.44 
3  16.2  22.76  25.32 
4  4.19  10.49  12.25 
Tests for teff   
 
Addis + Nazareth + 
Jimma + Shashemene 
0  83.44  59.14  62.99 
1  47.9  39.06  42.44 
2  24.64  22.76  25.32 
3  12.05  10.49  12.25 
Addis + Nazareth + 
Jimma + Shashemene + 
Dire Dawa 
0  109.18  83.2  87.31 
1  66.77  59.14  62.99 
2  36.45  39.06  42.44 
3  19.1  22.76  25.32 
4  5.44  10.49  12.25 
Addis + Nazareth +  
Jimma + Shashemene +  
Mekelle 
0  110.27  83.2  87.31 
1  71.26  59.14  62.99 
2  42.82  39.06  42.44 
3  15.9  22.76  25.32 
4  4.49  10.49  12.25 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Note: Critical values, taken from Osterwald-Lenum (1992), change depending on which of the three models is selected.  
8 
These results are (1) robust to various diagnostic tests, (2) generally in conformity with available 
market integration studies, and (3) consistent with the geographic distribution of production and 
consumption in Ethiopia. The diagnostic tests were performed at each step of the estimation. The lag 
length reduction tests and the residual analysis results for the final models are reported in Tables 4.2 and 
4.3. For both wheat and maize, the null hypothesis Ho: k = 2 against H1: k = 3 to 6 cannot be rejected 
(Table 4.3). However, for teff, a lag length of smaller than six is clearly rejected. Therefore, we initially 
specified VAR with two lags for wheat and maize and VAR with six lags for teff. However, if the LM 
tests indicated evidence of autocorrelations, the lag length was increased and the model re-estimated. The 
test results, presented in Table 4.4, suggest that there is no evidence of autocorrelation and the residuals 
are largely normal. 
Table 4.2—Test for lag length determination 
Ho: k=i=j-1 against  
H1: k=j 
Test for maize  Test for wheat  Test for teff 
LR test  LR test   LR test  
2 ) ( 2 n i j− χ   p-value  2 ) ( 2 n i j− χ   p-value    2 ) ( 2 n i j− χ   p-value 
K=5 against K=6  =
2
16 χ
15.082  0.519  =
2
16 χ
 25.842  0.056  =
2
16 χ
51.532   0.000 
K=4 against K=6  =
2
32 χ 30.464  0.544  =
2
32 χ 64.059  0.001  =
2
32 χ 67.572   0.000 
K=4 against K=5  =
2
16 χ
15.381  0.497  =
2
16 χ
38.216  0.001  =
2
16 χ
16.040   0.450 
K=3 against K=6  =
2
48 χ
44.322  0.624  =
2
48 χ
80.080  0.003  =
2
48 χ
96.858   0.000 
K=3 against K=5  =
2
32 χ 29.240  0.607  =
2
32 χ 54.238  0.008  =
2
32 χ 45.325  0.059 
K=3 against K=4  =
2
16 χ 13.858  0.609  =
2
16 χ 16.022  0.451  =
2
16 χ 29.286   0.022 
K=2 against K=6  =
2
64 χ
64.423  0.462  =
2
64 χ
97.863  0.004  =
2
64 χ
119.045   0.000 
K=2 against K=5  =
2
48 χ
49.341  0.419  =
2
48 χ
72.021  0.014    =
2
48 χ
67.512   0.033 
K=2 against K=4  =
2
32 χ 33.959  0.373  =
2
32 χ 33.805  0.380  =
2
32 χ 51.473   0.016 
K=2 against K=3  =
2
16 χ 20.101  0.216  =
2
16 χ 17.783  0.337  =
2
16 χ 22.187   0.137 
K=1 against K=6  =
2
80 χ
10.498  0.014  =
2
80 χ
26.711  0.001  =
2
80 χ
144.755   0.000 
K=1against K=5  =
2
64 χ
95.416  0.007  =
2
64 χ
100.868  0.002  =
2
64 χ
93.223   0.010 
K=1 against K=4  =
2
48 χ
80.035  0.003  =
2
48 χ
62.652  0.076    =
2
48 χ
77.183   0.005 
K=1 against K=3  =
2
32 χ 66.176  0.000  =
2
32 χ 46.630  0.046  =
2
32 χ 47.898   0.035 
K=1 against K=2  =
2
32 χ 46.075  0.000  =
2
32 χ 28.847  0.025  =
2
32 χ 25.711   0.058 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
    
9 
Table 4.3—Mis-specification tests on the final model for each cereal 
Grains/ 
equations 
Univariate tests  Multivariate tests 
ARCH  Normality  Autocorrelation 
2 ) ( 2 n i j− χ   p-value  2 ) ( 2 n i j− χ   p-value  LM test stats  p-
value 
Maize              
1  1.90  0.59  10.27  0.01 
LM(1) 
2
9 χ = :7.71  0.56  2  3.81  0.28  2.05  0.37 
3  1.68  0..64  4.27  0.12 
LM(2) 
2
9 χ = : 8.55 
0.48  4  0.66  0.88  4.07  0.13 
Wheat             
1  0.23  0.89  3.60  0.17  LM(1)
2
16 χ = :12.68 
0.70  2  1.84  0.40  9.35  0.02 
3  1.02  0.60  1.03  0.60  LM(2)
2
16 χ = : 5.11 
0.52  4  13.23  0.00  13.21  0.00 
Teff             
1  9.21  0.24  2.13  0.35  LM(2)
2
16 χ = : 5.11 
0.23  2  4.72  0.70  2.59  0.28 
3  6.92  0.44  3.48  0.18  LM(2) 
2
16 χ = : 3.98 
0.90  4  4.69  0.70  34.02  0.00 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Table 4.4—Cointegration rank tests and diagnostics on  ti f  
Cointegration rank tests 
( ) r Π
 
Trace test  Trace (95) 
0  36.78  35.07 
1  20.34  20.16 
2  6.46  9.14 
Mis-specification tests results 
  ARCH (4)  Normality 
Eqns  Test stats  p-value  Test stats  p-value 
1  6.54  0.16  1.94  0.38 
2  6.73  0.15  1.56  0.45 
3  2.95  0.57  4.49  0.11 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Although obtained through different methodology, the above results do not diverge much from 
those of the available studies. For example, the two most recent studies—by Negassa and Myers (2007) 
and by World Bank (2006)—draw very similar conclusions. Using an extended PBM, Negassa and Myers 
examined whether cereal market efficiency improved following the 1999 reforms and concluded that the 
policy change generally had little effect in improving spatial market efficiency. In particular, the study 
found that, for both maize and wheat, DD in the east and Desse in the north were not integrated and MK 
showed an insignificant improvement. The World Bank (2006) study, on the other hand, used a bivariate 
error correction model but drew a similar conclusion—that is, the northern and eastern deficit regions  
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were not integrated. A much older study (Dercon 1995) also found the eastern region (DD) not to be 
integrated in the long run, but this study did not include the northern market, MK. Finally, the regional 
production estimates of the Central Statistical Authority (CSA) of Ethiopia over the last five years 
indicate that more than 80 percent of the cereals in the country are produced in the regions where markets 
are integrated.  
The Relationship among the ti P ti f ⊥ =α for Each Cereal 
The main focus of this paper is to examine how shocks to one cereal market get transmitted to the markets 
for other cereals. We do this by (1) estimating long-run memories, ti P ti f ⊥ =α , for each cereal and (2) 
examining the relationships among the ft’s of the three cereals. The estimated ft for each cereal is 
presented below:
12  
  SM JM NZ AA Teff f
SM JM NZ AA Maize f




12 . 0 01 . 0 38 . 0 _
61 . 0 36 . 0 35 . 0 _
61 . 0 28 . 0 08 . 0 _
+ − + =
+ + − =




Following the method proposed by Gonzalo and Granger (1995), we now analyze the 
relationships among these three equations. The underlying idea is that since ft’s are I(1) variables by 
definition, they are cointegrated and have common long-run memories. The cointegration test results, 
along with diagnostics, are presented in Table 4.5. The numbers suggest that there are two cointegrating 
vectors and hence a unique long-run memory.  




Estimates of  ⊥ α  
 
Hypothesis tests 
Ho: shocks to  ti f
have no permanent  effect  
Test stat  p-value 
Maize  0.83 
= 2
1 χ
7.26  0.007 
Wheat  -0.52 
= 2
1 χ
3.24  0.072 
Teff  0.21 
= 2
1 χ
0.13  0.720 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
The test for whether shocks to a given variable have long-term impacts on the variables in the 
system is a test for unit vector, where the null hypothesis is that shocks to a given variable do not have 
long-term impacts on the variables in the system. Table 4.5 presents these test results, which include 
hypothesis test results along with estimated 
⊥ i α
. As discussed in Gonzalez-Rivera and Helfand 
                                                       
12As Gonzalez-Rivera and Helfand (2001) have discussed, these estimates provide some insights into the relative importance 
of the market locations. For example, consider the case of maize, which is dominated by the AA price, with JM and SM being 
two other important locations. Teff is largely influenced by AA, followed by NZ, with the other two locations having very small 
influence. For wheat, on the other hand, JM and SM appear to be the most dominant, followed by AA.  Being the largest city and 
consumption location, it is no surprise that AA has the largest influence on price formation. However, note that the production 
locations are also important, such as NZ for teff and SM and JM for maize and wheat.  
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(2001), the estimates of 
⊥ i α
 indicate the relative importance of each commodity in driving the long-
run prices. The hypothesis test results, on the other hand, determine the significance of a shock to a given 
commodity on the dynamics of itself and other cereals. Notice that the hypothesis is strongly rejected for 
maize and wheat but accepted for teff. Thus, it can be concluded that shocks to either the maize or the 
wheat market will influence each other, but the teff market will have insignificant effects on the other 
two. 
Generalized Impulse Response Analysis 
The generalized impulse responses to a shock of one standard error to long-run memories of maize and 
wheat are presented in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. The results are consistent with the results of the previous 
section but provide further details in terms of persistence and transmission of shocks across commodity 
and over a three-year time horizon. Three findings are obvious from these figures:  
1.  Shocks to both maize and wheat have very little impact on teff.  
2.  Shocks to maize have a relatively higher impact on wheat than do shocks to wheat on maize.  
3.  Shocks to either maize or wheat do not die down within a three-year time horizon.  
Given that teff is the most cherished cereal among Ethiopians, this finding might seem a little 
counterintuitive at first sight. However, the finding is very consistent with the market structure. Teff is 
more resilient to climatic shocks and its production has not experienced as much technological change as 
has that of maize and wheat. Simple measures of variability, such as coefficient of variations, show that 
both yield and price are more stable for teff than for any other cereal in the country. By contrast, in the 
time period considered for this analysis, maize and wheat have shown more growth and experienced more 
shocks, such as the collapse in 2002.   
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5.  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The analysis in the previous section presents evidence on the extent of markets and the significance and 
persistence of shock transmission over time. Although obtained through different methodology, the 
results on market integration are largely in conformity with those of earlier studies. The analysis of the 
inter-commodity price relationships and shock transmission is new. The results suggest that shocks to 
both maize and wheat markets have significant long-run impacts, although shocks to maize markets have 
relatively larger impacts on wheat than shocks to wheat markets on maize. These findings have important 
policy messages for managing cereal price instability and for planning food aid imports and distribution 
as well as other food-based intervention programs.  
Implications for Grain Price Stabilization  
The relative importance of maize in the long-run relationships and its significance in shock transmission 
imply that price stabilization schemes, in whatever form, are likely to be more effective if they focus on 
maize. The collapse of grain markets in 2002 and price hikes in 2006/07 can provide further insights 
about this inference. With help from international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), farmers began 
to adopt improved maize technology on a large scale in the late 1990s. As farmers adopted the new 
technology in favorable weather conditions, the country harvested two consecutive years of bumper crops 
in 2001 and 2002. However, the blessings of the technology did not translate into improvements in farm 
households’ well-being. A few years earlier, the government had suspended minimum price support 
policies, and therefore when production boomed, maize prices collapsed—so much so that maize farmers 
allegedly did not find it profitable to harvest their maize crops. 
The situation warranted some form of intervention. The EGTE entered into the market to 
purchase maize at a preannounced price and exported 11,000 tons of maize. However, the data for 
subsequent years suggest that the event had already shattered farmers’ confidence in the market. Gabre-
Madhin (2003) estimated that farm gate prices of maize declined by an unprecedented 80 percent in early 
2002, the ratio of input prices to producers’ price jumped from 1.7 in 2000 to about 9.0 in 2002, and 
fertilizer application rates declined by more than 20 percent in the following cropping season. More 
importantly, data from the CSA suggest that, unlike that of other cereals, total maize production declined 
for four years in a row following the price collapse. This was a big blow to a crop that has the highest 
yield rates,
13 has shown the highest production growth over the past 10 years, and perhaps has the largest 
future potential for regional trade.  
In late 2005 and early 2006, Ethiopian grain markets started exhibiting quite a different trend. 
Despite consecutive years of good harvests, prices of major cereals increased sharply. Between 2005 and 
2006, nominal prices increased by more than 48 percent for teff, more than 27 percent for wheat, and 
about 10 percent for maize. This sharp rise in cereal prices was a major concern for the government and 
its development partners. For policymakers it was an unacceptable rise in cereal prices, and the 
government temporarily instituted food rationing in major urban centers.
14 The World Bank 
commissioned a study to analyze the situation. It concluded that monetary policy phenomena accounted 
for much of the increase (about 89 percent) in cereal price (World Bank 2007). The study argued that the 
real price of teff had increased by about 26 percent and that of wheat by 8 percent but that maize prices 
had actually declined by 6.5 percent. Although they are not strictly comparable, these numbers are 
consistent with the results in Table 4.5 and Figure 5.1 of our analysis. 
                                                       
13 Maize yield rates over the past 10 years have been 1.75 to 2.2 tons per hectare, compared to 1.4 to 1.5 tons per hectare for 
wheat and 0.8 to 0.9 tons per hectare for teff.  
14 The urban wheat rationing program began in April 2007 in Addis Ababa and in July 2007 in other regional cities. 
Beneficiary households received 25 kilograms of wheat per month. Since its inception, the rationing program has distributed 
more than 950,000 tons of wheat.   
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Figure 5.1—Generalized impulse responses due to one S.E shocks for FT_Maize 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 5.2—Generalized impulse response due to one S.E shocks to FT_Wheat 
  
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Thus, the results of our analysis are consistent with the above experiences. This suggests that 
managing price instability of maize and wheat in a given price band can help promote grain-sector 
development. However, this does not mean reintroduction of old-style parastatal-centric stabilization 
policies. Instead, it means institutionalizing the policies that have been implemented on ad hoc and 
temporary bases, such as giving a minimum price support in 2002 and rationing food in 2007. If 
implemented properly, a credible price band will bring transparency to the market, promote adoption of 
modern technology, and boost much-needed supply responses.   
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Implications for Food Aid–Supported Programs  
Most of the food aid imports to Ethiopia come as wheat and wheat flour, and a very large share of local 
procurement by EGTE, the World Food Programme (WFP), and other NGOs is maize. Since shocks to 
these two commodity markets have long-run impacts, a coordinated effort among the donors and national 
counterparts is needed to come up with a strategy to ensure that food aid–supported programs do not 
displace trade, cause production disincentives, and generate instability. In the Ethiopian context, two 
issues are particularly important in this regard: (1) inconsistency between food aid imports and production 
in terms of quantity and timing, and (2) targeting of food aid–supported programs.  
Given Ethiopia’s level of poverty, weaknesses in markets, and recurrence of production shocks, 
the role of food aid in managing emergencies is perhaps inevitable. Thus, the issue has been planning 
food aid imports and distribution in ways that minimize their adverse effects. A rule of thumb in food aid 
planning is that the higher the domestic production, the lower the imported food aid. Historical data 
suggest that quite the opposite has happened in Ethiopia. From 1993 to 2005, the correlation coefficient 
between food aid and domestic wheat production has been positive (0.13). This suggests that even in the 
years of good harvest, there have been large food aid inflows. This was particularly true in 2002, the year 
of the cereal market collapse, when food aid inflow jumped to 1.2 million tons, compared to about 
300,000 tons in 2001. Such unplanned arrival and distribution of food aid can generate large variability in 
the cereal market, causing producing regions to face problems clearing their surpluses and often forcing 
farmers to sell at lower prices. If the food aid programs are driven by need, the implementing agencies 
should have a clear mechanism to assess the need and place the aid request accordingly. This underscores 
the importance of an accurate crop forecasting system. Currently, three agencies (CSA, USAID, and the 
FAO’s WFP) carry out such forecasting, but the estimates seldom converge (World Bank 2007). Thus, if 
the government and the aid donors coordinate to strengthen the crop forecasting and emergency need 
assessment, the returns can be large in terms of improved planning of both food aid imports and local 
procurement.  
The issue of mistargeting is often cited as the main reason for the adverse effects of food aid 
programs. The underlying idea is simple: If food aid goes to the households who would otherwise not 
have access to food, there would be little to no adverse effect on markets. In a global context, Barrett and 
Maxwell nicely articulate this fact by noting, “If the donor community could improve the targeting of 
food aid, it could improve the effectiveness of food aid in accomplishing its primary humanitarian and 
development aim—the maintenance of valuable human capital—and reduce many of the errors that 
sometimes make food aid controversial, ineffective, or both” (2002, page 2). 
However, in practice, foolproof targeting has proved difficult to institute, and this has led to 
discussions on various ill effects of food aid. Studies argue that food aid distribution in Ethiopia is 
geographically biased (Jayne et al. 2002), targeting of poor households is imperfect (Dercon and Krishnan 
2001), and an estimated 30 percent of food aid was mistargeted (WFP 2004). On the other hand, studies 
on adverse effects of food aid draw very mixed conclusions. Of the available recent studies, one finds no 
adverse impacts of food aid at both micro and macro levels (Abdulai, Barrett, and Hoddinott 2005) and 
two others find positive impacts in terms of nutritional benefits (Yamano, Christiansen, and Alderman 
2005) and consumption growth (Gilligan and Hoddinott 2006). Yet others find significant negative 
effects, both indirect (through reduced producer prices) and direct (through reduced grain production), 
using both macro- and micro-level data (Demeke F. Gutu, T. Ferede 2004; World Bank 2006).  
Without taking any side of the debate, one can argue that it is difficult to convince the skeptics 
that large food aid has no adverse effects on markets and production. Given that shocks to wheat have 
significant long-run impacts, that food aid flow is inconsistent with domestic production, and that crop 
forecast varies by sources, it is clear that careful planning of food aid imports can contribute toward 
improving price stability and much-needed supply responses.    
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6.  CONCLUSION 
If agricultural markets are characterized by inadequate infrastructure, information asymmetry, and 
incomplete markets—as is the case in many African countries—prices are bound to be volatile and some 
forms of intervention can be justified to address various sources of market failures. Experiences with 
market liberalization suggest that these policy rationales are still valid in many countries, where 
withdrawal of governments led to increased price variability and policy reversals. Ethiopia has had these 
types of experiences: Price instability has increased and government has had to intervene occasionally to 
address price collapse and price hikes in recent years. Thus, the challenge for the government is finding a 
more cost-effective price intervention strategy.  
This paper has been an attempt to contribute toward that end. Using monthly prices of three major 
cereals in the country, it has analyzed intercommodity price relationships to examine whether targeting 
one of the cereals can achieve broader price stabilization objectives. Three key results emerge from the 
analysis:  
1.  Markets in the major grain-producing regions are integrated. 
2.  Maize is the most important of the three cereals in the common long-run memory, followed 
by wheat and then teff.  
3.  While shocks to both maize and wheat have significant long-run impacts on each other, these 
do not transmit to teff markets.  
In light of these results, the paper argues that setting credible price bands for maize and wheat in 
Ethiopia can stabilize cereal prices in a more cost-effective way. Under the current policy environment, 
this would mean institutionalizing the policies that are being implemented on ad hoc and temporary bases, 
such as giving minimum price support in 2002 and providing wheat rations to urban dwellers in 2007. 
Given that food aid imports are largely wheat and that shocks to wheat have significant long-run impacts, 
the results also have implications for food aid–supported programs. The debate over targeting and adverse 
effects of food aid notwithstanding, historical data suggest that food aid inflow to the country has not 
been consistent with domestic production. This suggests that the government and its development 
partners should coordinate to strengthen crop forecasting and food aid planning to avoid adverse effects 
on cereal markets.   
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